Consti II case digest: PEOPLE VS VIDUYA

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G.R. No. L-60025 September 11, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
VIRGINIA MATOS-VIDUYA y GALPA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

FACTS: Appellant Virginia Matos-Viduya appeals from the decision of the Manila RTC, Branch 35, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. The information alleges that on or about the 26th day of August, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack the person of ATTY. JOSE VIDUYA, her husband, stabbing him several times with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct cause of his death. 

The prosecution presented the following evidence:

(1) Mrs. Remedios Domingo, a lessee on the ground floor of the victim's house, testified that she was awakened by moaning sounds, followed by a thud, emanating from the second floor where the victim lived. Mrs. Domingo, a lessee in the same house for 25 years and had known the victim to suffer from a heart ailment, presumed that the latter was having a heart attack so she immediately ran towards the apartment of the victim's family driver, Melanio Cambel, which was only 4 meters away and shouted to Melanio as he was having a heart attack.

(2) Cambel declared that on that evening, he was aroused from his sleep by the shouts of Mrs. Domingo. He ran upstairs and was let in by Lydia Firmanes, cousin of the accused. Cambel saw the victim clutching the handle of the refrigerator and leaning thereon for support. Immediately standing behind the victim was the accused holding a knife with both hands. As Cambel approached, the accused stooped down saying "Diosko, Diosko”, trying to conceal the knife from him. Cambel asked the victim what happened but the latter was too weak to speak. Cambel then asked the accused why she stabbed her husband. The accused initially did not answer, but hesitantly muttered "Magnanakaw, magnanakaw" after being questioned for the second time. Cambel then requested assistance to bring the victim to the hospital (St. Jude Hospital in Sampaloc, Manila) but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.

(3) Florentino Bagallon, an investigator of the WPD, declared that he conducted an on-the-spot ocular inspection of the victim's house and found in the bedroom a single bed with a white blanket soaked in blood. He recovered two pieces of bladed knives at the east yard (parking lot) of the victim's residence. One of the knives had a bended blade. On the east wall, he found a rectangular hole which used to hold an air-conditioning unit and also noticed some pieces of wood placed under a parked heavy truck on the east yard. The accused informed him that those pieces of wood used to cover the rectangular hole. Thereafter, he advised the accused to go with him to the police headquarters for a formal investigation. Bagallon testified that at 3:15 in the morning of August 26, 1980, the accused executed a salaysay. Significant portions of the said salaysay are quoted, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

7. T-Ano ba sa alam ninyo and dahilan ng kanyang pagkamatay?

S-Sinaksak dahil sa panloloob na ginawa sa amin.

xxx xxx xxx

15. T-Nang marinig ninyo ang ungol na nanggaling sa inyong asawa at kayo nga noon ay nagising, ano naman ang inyong nakita?

S-Dalawang lalaki, ang isa ay nakatayo sa tabi ng kama ko at may nakatutok na patalim sa aking ulo at sa kabilang kama naman ay nakita ko na may isa pa ring lalaki na sumasaksak sa aking asawa.

xxx xxx xxx

26. T-Nakikilala po ba naman ninyo and dalawang lalaking pumasok sa loob ng kuwarto ninyo?

S-Kung sakaling makita ko uli ay maaari kong makilala.

27. T-Ano po ba ang hitsura nila?

S-Yun pong sumaksak sa asawa ko ay maitim, mga 5'3 po, nakasuot ng dark color at yong tumutok naman sa akin ay may mga 5'2, kayumanggi, slender, putian and suot na damit.

xxx xxx xxx

31. T-Nang maganap ang pangloloob sa inyo at pananaksak sa asawa mo hanggang sa makaalis ang dalawang lalaki, nasaan ba naman ang mga taong kasama mo sa bahay?

S-Nagising silang lahat sa pagsigaw ko.

32. T-At ano ba naman ang isinigaw mo?

S-Magnanakaw, magnanakaw!!!

xxx xxx xxx

Pfc. Bagallon also stated that on same day at about 5:30 in the afternoon, the accused was again invited for further investigation thereafter executing a second "salaysay" reiterating her narration contained in her first "salaysay" executed earlier that morning. This time, however, she declared that one of the malefactors was a certain Edito Pateño, their former employee. On August 30, 1980 at 2:20 in the morning, Mrs. Virginia Viduya again executed a (third) "salaysay". Later, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same date, Mrs. Viduya executed her extrajudicial confession wherein she categorically admitted authorship of the killing of her husband. However, she claimed that she merely acted in self-defense.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The accused alleged that she was misled and deceived by Pfc. Bagallon into signing her extrajudicial confession since he told her that she will not be detained if she signs the document.

After due trial, the lower court rendered its decision adjudging the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:  WON the lower court erred in admitting the extra judicial confession of the accused

RULING: Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that: “Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”

In this case, it is undisputed that the extrajudicial confession was executed without the presence of counsel. We quote the relevant excerpt from the extrajudicial confession:

xxx xxx xxx

T- Ikaw ay may karapatan pa rin kumuha ng serbisyo ng isang abogado para makatulong mo sa imbestigasyong ito at kung wala kang makukuha, ikaw ay aming bibigyan ng libreng abogado, ano ngayon and iyong masasabi?

S- Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal (pointing to Assistant Fiscal DOMINGO A. MENDOZA) kaya hindi ko na kailangan and abogado.

xxx xxx xxx

The trial judge, in holding that the extrajudicial confession is admissible, reasoned out that there is no prohibition for Assistant Fiscal Mendoza to act as counsel for the accused as it is his primordial duty not only to prosecute a case but also to protect the rights of an accused and to see that no violence, force, coercion or intimidation be used to secure from a person under custodial investigation his statement.

Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution favors the accused and is fully applicable to this case. It is also elementary that a Fiscal or Prosecutor cannot be a lawyer for the accused at the same time.

In his testimony, Assistant Fiscal Mendoza stated that his main functions as Assistant Fiscal in the City of Manila are to prosecute cases and to render duties as an inquest fiscal. (an inquest fiscal advises police investigators as to whether or not a prima facie case exists in cases which they investigate.) Whether or not the subsequent trial of a confessant's case will be assigned to him as prosecutor is immaterial. He cannot pretend to act as defense counsel.

An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even during custodial investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the accused during custodial investigation. What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Moreover, the answer of the accused ("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado") is a palpable indication that she did not fully understand her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.

The remaining issue left for determination is whether or not the prosecution evidence, absent the extrajudicial confession, is sufficient to sustain the lower court's conviction of the accused.

A rule firmly entrenched in our criminal justice system is that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. (People v. Ramirez, 116 SCRA 48 [1982]; People v. Co, 163 SCRA 453 [1988]) In the case before us, the defense of the accused is weak. In trying to exculpate herself, the appellant tried to shift culpability to another person. The attempt is not convincing. But though the accused's defense is weak, the prosecution's evidence is not strong enough to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the guilty party.

A thorough review of the prosecution's evidence discloses that the only proof linking the accused to the killing of her husband is the testimony of Cambel. It is not shown how twelve stab wounds could have been inflicted by a woman under the circumstances of his testimony. Two knives were involved in the stabbing. Other than Cambel's testimony, there is no other evidence pointing to the accused as the author of the crime.

Moreover, the trial court's complete reliance on only one of 3 extrajudicial statements and its total rejection of the two other statements without any independent evidence or proof for such action, is not explained.

Considering the paucity of the State's evidence, we are not satisfied that the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to the accused-appellant has been overthrown. The constitutional presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the appellant's culpability. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971]) The prosecution failed to produce such proof. This Court, therefore, has no other recourse but to acquit the accused-appellant.

JUDGMENT of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another entered ACQUITTING her on reasonable doubt.