Facts:
The following uncontroverted facts appear in the record: On December 7,
1956, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Cabalian,
Leyte, with the crime of less serious physical injuries for having inflicted
wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint
would "require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and
will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of his customary
labors for the game period of time." The accused pleaded guilty to the
complaint and was on December 8, 1957 found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto
mayor and to pay damages to
the offended party in the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully
served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and
so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the
accused before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious
physical injuries. The information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the
accused on Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him for a
period of from 1 ½ months to 2 ½ months. After trial the accused was found
guilty of serious physical injuries and sentenced in the manner indicated in
first paragraph hereof. This is the decision now sough to be set aside and
reversed in this appeal.
Issue:
W/N
the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is
a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
Ruling:
In the Melo vs. People case, we stated the ruling to
be that:
. . . Stating it in another form, the
rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense
and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and
distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. (85 Phil., 769-770).
Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new
ruling? In other words, has a new fact supervened, like death in the case of
Melo vs. People, which changes the character of
the offense into one which was not in existence at the time the case for less
serious physical injuries was filed? We do not believe that a new fact supervened,
or that a new fact has come into existence. What happened is that the first
physician that examined the wounds of the offended party certified on December
10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound, incised, wrist lateral,
right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15
days to heal and incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period of time
from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on
December 8, 1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty of less serious physical
injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
Counsel
for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in the case at bar, as a
result of which another offense had been ommitted.
Under
the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to agree with the contention
made on behalf of appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or
occurred, which has transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries
to serious physical injuries.
We attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the
period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive
examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination taken at the
time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the
delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination,
but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. As we
have stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which
justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People
vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule
of double jeopardy.
We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting
officers that before filing informations for physical injuries, thorough
physical and medical examinations of the injuries should first be made to avoid
instances, like the present, where by reason of the important Constitutional provision
of double jeopardy, the accused can not be held to answer for the graver
offense committed.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of
conviction is set aside and the defendant-appellant acquitted of the charge of
serious physical injuries. Without costs.
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