Consti II case digest: MELO VS PEOPLE

DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT/ SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE

FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegeldly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night, the victim died from his wounds.  Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution and the information was amended.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD:

Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:

If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial.

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”. It meant that when a person is charged with an offence and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.

The protection of the Constitution inihibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. “SAME OFFENSE” under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical.

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice versa.

This rule however does not apply when the second offencse was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.  Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction hte injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which charges the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offence.