G.R. No. L-25966 December 28, 1979
This is a special civil action
for certiorari by the petitioner to annul the order of
respondent Judge of the CFI of Catanduanes in Civil Case No. 546.
FACTS: On
January 12, 1966, the herein plaintiffs-respondents filed the civil case for
prohibition with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with the CFI
of Catanduanes against defendants Jorge V. Almojuela, Dominador Monjardin, Fermin A. Bagadiong (the herein
petitioner) and Armando Ala who are the Governor, Vice Governor, Provincial
Treasurer and Provincial Auditor of the Province of Catanduanes, respectively.
In the said petition for
injunction, it is alleged that defendants, including the herein petitioner (Bagadiong), are authorizing, approving
and effecting the disbursements of public funds of the province based on the
annual provincial budget that, allegedly, was not duly approved by the Provincial
Board since plaintiffs-respondents did not participate in the deliberation of
the same.
On January 14, 1966, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the respondent Judge against the
defendants commanding them to desist from authorizing and making any further
disbursements of funds from the budget in question.
A complaint in intervention was
filed by herein respondent PERFECTO praying, among others, that all original
parties to the case be ordered to refund the province all moneys appropriated
under the falsified budget; and that all the said original parties be condemned
to pay an amount equal to all disbursements under the falsified budget, by way
of exemplary damages.
On January 31, 1966, the
respondent judge denied the motion
to vacate and lift the writ of preliminary injunction.
When the case was called for
trial, counsel for plaintiffs called one of the defendants, the herein
petitioner, Bagadiong, to the
witness stand as one of the witnesses for the plaintiffs.
Counsel for the defendants
raised the objection that the said party cannot be called as a witness for the
plaintiffs because it would violate his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. On the other hand, counsel for the plaintiffs contended
that since this is a purely civil action, the right against self-incrimination
is not involved, and if any testimony elicited from the herein petitioner would
tend to incriminate himself, there would be ample time for the herein
petitioner to raise the proper objection.
The respondent Judge sided with
the plaintiffs. After a verbal motion to reconsider the aforesaid order was
denied by the respondent Judge, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari.
In its memorandum, the Bagadiong contends that the provision
of the Rules of Court which authorizes a party to call the adverse party to the
witness stand applies only to purely civil actions where the defendant
does not run the risk of being prosecuted for any offense. Likewise, the
petitioner asserts that the right against self-incrimination can only be
claimed when the incriminatory question is being propounded and not before, by
a mere witness, but not by a party defendant, as in the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON
petitioner can be compelled to testify as a witness for respondents and WON
such violates his right against self-incrimination.
RULING: There
is no legal impediment for a party to call any of the adverse parties to be his
witness, as clearly provided in Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
It
is (only) in a criminal case where the accused may not be compelled to testify.
But while the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a
person in ALL types of cases, said privilege, in proceedings other than a
criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option to refuse to answer incriminating question, and not a prohibition of inquiry.
As aptly stated by this Court
in the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al:
Except in criminal cases, there in no rule prohibiting a party
litigant form utilizing his adversary as a witness. As a matter of fact,
Section 83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court, expressly authorizes a party to call an
adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule is, of course,
subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify
against himself. But it is established that the privilege
against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper
time to invoke it is when a question calling for a criminating answer is
propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked there
would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the
witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence
(Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify "cannot
decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness" and
"no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a
criminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time
only, the claim of privilege may properly be imposed." (Emphasis
supplied).
In the instant case, petitioner
invoked the privilege even prior to any question being propounded, and simply
declined to take the witness stand. In the above-cited Gonzales case, it will be noted that the privilege
against self-incrimination must be invoked when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded (asked) because before a question is asked,
there would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from
the witness is self-incriminating or not. Moreover, the herein
petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a criminal case where
he is an accused but in civil action. This is expressly permitted by Section 6,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which authorizes a party to call any adverse
party as his witness.
In the later case of Suarez
v. Tengco, 2 SCRA 71, 73-74, the following was stated:
Here,
petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any question, and simply
declined to take the witness stand. Note that in the Gonzales case,
above-cited, the adverse party was directed to take the witness stand in
proceedings to investigate an alleged failure to pay overtime compensation,
which, under corresponding special laws, carries a penal sanction. Here,
petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a criminal case where
he is an accused, but in an independent civil action which, although arising
from the same facts involved in a criminal case pending before the same court,
is still be regarded by law as an "entirely separate and distinct"
action, governed by a corresponding different set of rules (Civil Code of the
Phil., Art. 2177).
The almost exact similarity of
the instant case and the case just cited leaves no room for doubt, and there is
complete justification therefore that the same ruling must be applied here.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
to prohibit the respondent judge from directing petitioner to take the witness
stand and testify is denied, without prejudice to petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against
self-incrimination when questions are propounded to him on the stand.
No comments:
Post a Comment