Consti II case digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, Respondents.

Double Jeopardy

Requisites

G.R. No. 164185               July 23, 2008

FACTS:

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.

On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.

Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted him of the crime charged.

The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:

Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Although this Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by law and that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.